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Abstract
We investigated the selective impairment of mirror image discrimination in a patient with bilateral parieto-occipital lesions
(FIM). We report a difﬁculty with the discrimination between mirror images more selective than has been previously reported
(Turnbull OH, McCarthy RA. Failure to discriminate between mirror-image objects: a case of viewpoint-independent object
recognition? Neurocase 1996;2:63). FIM was asked to judge, in ﬁve same/different experiments, whether pairs of simultaneously
presented line drawings of objects were identical. FIM demonstrated only a minor impairment in discriminating between
orientations in the picture plane but was at chance in making discrimination between mirror images. An experiment with normal
observers established that our results were not due to differences in task difﬁculty. Two further experiments investigated the effects
of rotation on the discrimination of letters and geometric shapes. FIM’s impairment extended to geometric shapes but not to
letters. These results would be consistent with the preservation of an abstract representation for object recognition that did not
code the difference between mirror image views. © 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Object orientation; Object recognition
www.elsevier.com/locate/neuropsychologia
1. Introduction
It has long been known that patients with parietal
lesions, and in particular right-sided lesions, demon-
strate problems with tasks requiring spatial analysis
[34,61]. These difﬁculties include dealing with object
changes both in the picture plane [13,24,47,54,55] and
in the depth plane [38,55,63]. However, right parietal
brain-damage does not invariably lead to impairments
in dealing with both types of orientation change
[12,54,55]. For example, Farah and Hammond [12]
reported that a deﬁcit in mental rotation skills did not
prevent accurate object identiﬁcation even when objects
were inverted. Furthermore, and most critical for our
study, Turnbull et al. [54] reported patients who were
selectively impaired either on inversion or mirror image
judgements. Evidence from normal observers also sup-
ports the dissociation between the types of orientation
change [30].
The case RJ of Turnbull and McCarthy [55] is of
particular interest. He was selectively impaired in dis-
criminating between mirror images in tasks that might
appear to be trivially easy. The patient was not required
to perform the mentally difﬁcult task of rotating two
objects to determine whether they have different hand-
edness (i.e., were mirror images). RJ was simulta-
neously presented with three line drawings and merely
asked which one was different. Whereas he could do
this task if the odd-one-out was inverted, he could not
if it was a mirror image. Mirror image discrimination
was made even easier for the case (RK) reported in
Davidoff and Warrington [9]. In that study, the patient
was simply presented with two line drawings and asked
if they were the same or different. While it may be easy
to understand that patients with spatial problems
would not be able to use mental rotation, one might
have considered that their ability to make shape or
orientation discriminations would be sufﬁcient to judge
simultaneously presented mirror images simply as same
or different.
The difﬁculty that RJ and RK showed bears com-
parison to the common problem children have in learn-
ing to discriminate between lateral mirror image pairs
of letters [8,10]. Indeed, Rudel and Teuber [42] reported
that 3-year-old children were virtually incapable of
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +44-207-9197888; fax: +44-207-
9197873.
E-mail address: j.davidoff@gold.ac.uk (J. Davidoff).
0028-3932/01/$ - see front matter © 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
PII: S0028-3932(01)00039-2
J. Daidoff, E.K. Warrington / Neuropsychologia 39 (2001) 1022–1036 1023
learning such discriminations. The difﬁculty is over-
come in most people to the point that the task becomes
trivial; however, recent data suggest that the primate
brain is, in fact, neuronally unprepared to make these
discriminations. Neurones in the macaque inferotempo-
ral cortex were found to be invariant to the handedness
of the stimulus array [41]. Nevertheless, despite their
insensitivity to lateral mirror image pairs (e.g., b vs. d),
these neurones were sensitive to vertical mirror image
pairs (e.g., b vs. p). Humans, too, ﬁnd left–right mirror
image discriminations considerably more difﬁcult than
vertical mirror image discriminations [8,40]. The
present paper extends these ﬁndings by considering the
mechanisms subserving object recognition in a patient
for whom the ability to make mirror image discrimina-
tions is impaired.
Two types of representations that have been pro-
posed for object recognition. The types of representa-
tion in which different object views, including the
mirror image, are coded separately are termed view-spe-
ciﬁc [33,50]. Models of object recognition based on such
representations are contrasted with those that require,
or emphasise, representations to be view-independent
[3,33]. Biederman’s model, for example, is based on
basic object parts (geons) for which mirror images may
be treated as equivalent in recognising an object. These
representations are similar to the canonical view repre-
sentations investigated in our previous research [9,63].
When the task entails naming, data from normal ob-
servers imply that we use only the canonical view
representations. Hence, the facilitation in naming la-
tency from priming is invariant with respect to mirror
images [4,28,29] though this may be modulated by
attention [49].
The neuropsychological evidence is compatible with
the data from normal observers because an inability to
make mirror image discriminations does not prevent
good object identiﬁcation of canonical view objects
[9,53–55]. In the present paper, we consider whether
the difﬁculty of mirror image discriminations could
derive from their rather limited importance for object
identiﬁcation. If an observer were conducting mirror
image discriminations solely from canonical view repre-
sentations there would be no difﬁculty at all in under-
standing why mirror image discriminations were so
hard. Indeed, a recent report concluded that it was just
this inability to disengage from object-centred represen-
tations that prevented mirror image discriminations
[58].
Our present investigation concerns a patient (FIM)
with pronounced difﬁculty with spatial tasks. The pa-
tient bears a striking similarity to the case RJ presented
by Turnbull and McCarthy [55]. RJ showed impaired
mirror image discrimination with the preservation of
orientation for inversion judgements but that was the
only misorientation contrasted with mirror images. Our
investigation will compare mirror image discriminations
to changes in orientation in the picture plane. Recent
evidence suggests that not all orientations are equally
represented in object representations. For example, in
monkey, Ashbridge et al. [1] showed that a greater
number of head and body cells were coded for the
upright. Thus, recognition of non-upright views of
heads and body stimuli could take longer because cell
activity to these orientations would be weaker. Karnath
et al. [24] thereby argued that upright views of other
types of visual stimuli might be preferentially coded
and, for that reason, make inversion judgements less
sensitive to neuronal insult. We will, therefore, widen
the number of orientation changes to be compared with
mirror image discrimination. Our ﬁrst aim was, there-
fore, to consider the selective impairment for mirror
image discriminations. It would be even more remark-
able, if the impairment were present when the more
difﬁcult picture plane orientation discriminations were
found to be intact.
Our second aim was to address questions of object
representation in three ways. First, in many object
views, determining the orientation of the principal axis
would be sufﬁcient to differentiate an object from its
mirror image (Fig. 1). We investigated those displays to
ask whether a mirror image impairment was present
even when the orientation judgement was within the
capacity of the patient. Thus, we examined whether an
impairment in mirror image discrimination was present
when the spatial demands of the task should predict
otherwise. Second, we considered mirror image discrim-
inations of non-objects. Most of the previously used
stimuli involve object representations but, in our
paradigm, successful performance could be achieved
from mechanisms involving shape discrimination or
spatial frame analysis. Therefore, we compared mirror
image tasks using familiar objects to performance with
geometrical ﬁgures. Third, we considered particular
Fig. 1. Example of non-base object discriminations: (a) and (b),
mirror image; (c) and (d), inversion.
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types of display (e.g., letters) for which handedness
must be coded for correct identiﬁcation.
2. Case report
FIM, a 35 year old Bangledeshi housewife, (resident
in England for 10 years) was admitted to a general
hospital 9 days post partum in December 1992. She had
a severe frontal headache and was drowsy and disorien-
tated. Over the next 10 days her condition deteriorated
and she developed a left-sided weakness and a right-
sided hemiparesis. At this time, she was transferred to
the National Hospital, Queen Square. A MRI scan
demonstrated bilateral infarctions of the parietal-occipi-
tal regions extending to the left frontal lobe; this was
considered to be due to a cerebral venus sinus thrombo-
sis. She made a slow recovery and, on examination at
the time of her discharge to the rehabilitation unit in
February 1993, she had a wide-based gait, a minor
residual right hemiplegia, weakness of the left leg, a
homonymous left inferior quadrantinopia and a degree
of visual disorientation that impaired her point localisa-
tion and depth perception (for further details see [26]).
At the time of the present investigation, begun in
July 1998, she had continued to improve and had
achieved a degree of independence in the activities of
daily life. The inferior left quadrantinopia was still
present.
3. Neuropsychological assessment
English was her second language, which she had
learned to a reasonable level. Her vocabulary was fairly
extensive. Neither in naming tasks nor in propositional
speech was any paraphasic responses noted. She was
not left–right disoriented on her own body. Our assess-
ment of her cognitive abilities focused on her visual–
spatial and perceptual abilities.
3.1. Early isual processing
Visual acuity was measured at 6/6 on the Ffoukes
symbols test. On the Efron shape test, she scored 20/20
on an easy discrimination (square 2×2 versus oblong
1.5×2.5) and 17/20 on a more difﬁcult discrimina-
tion (square 2×2 versus oblong 1.8×2.2); this is
marginally weak. On a subsequent occasion, she scored
8/8 for the more difﬁcult discrimination. She was also
presented with a series of ﬁve ovals all having a ratio of
axes 1.7:1. These ovals reduced in size from the largest,
having a principal axis of 6 cm, in steps of approxi-
mately 0.5 cm. She was able to rank/order by size the
series of ﬁve ovals. In a further test, her ability to
discriminate the larger of two adjacent ovals was satis-
factory (5/5 correct).
Fig. 2. Example of symmetrical and asymmetrical shapes.
Her ability to judge whether ﬁgures were symmetrical
was assessed by showing white geometric shapes on a
black background. Five of these ﬁgures were symmetri-
cal and ﬁve (made from different halves of the same
symmetrical ﬁgures) were asymmetrical (Fig. 2). The
ﬁgures were also presented upside down to give a total
of 20 presentations. FIM correctly identiﬁed the ﬁgures
as symmetric or asymmetric 19/20 times.
FIM obtained a perfect score on the shape detection
test of the visual object and space perception (VOSP)
(20/20 correct). She was able to detect the illusory
contours of the Kanizsa ﬁgures and was able to name
correctly eight basic colours [2].
3.2. Object recognition
FIM attempted the object perception tests of the
VOSP [61] (Table 1). In contrast to her fairly satisfac-
tory performance on the tests of early visual processing,
she scored at an impaired level on all four tests of
object recognition. She also attempted a version of the
Unconventional Views Object Recognition Test on
which she scored 7/20, which represents a marked
impairment. By contrast, she was able to identify and
name 19/20 corresponding conventional views, which is
a normal score. Her satisfactory ability to identify and
Table 1
Perceptual and spatial test scoresa
Score 5% cut off
Silhouettes 14/30 16
1414/20Progressive silhouettes
Object decision 9/20 15
1717/20Fragmented letters
8/20 18Position discrimination
Dot counting 83/10
Number location 70/10
Cube analysis 62/10
a FIM’s test scores on the visual object and space perception
(VOSP) battery with 5% cut-off scores for standardisation sample.
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name canonical object representations was further
demonstrated by her ability to name the majority of the
Snodgrass and Vanderwart [46] corpus of line drawings
(212/260 correct). The majority of her errors were
misperceptions. Thus, FIM clearly demonstrates a dis-
continuity between her very poor performance on tasks
in which the perceptual difﬁculty has been manipulated
and her competent performance in identifying canonical
object representations; this is the hallmark of an apper-
ceptive agnosia.
She was also tested on the recognition of object parts
([9] Exp. 1). In this study, observers are required to
identify, from an object part, the object from which the
part is taken. The parts are graded as hard, middle and
easy difﬁculty for identiﬁcation. The examination fol-
lowed the procedure of the earlier study. Of the 72
items for which data are presented in Davidoff and
Warrington [9], FIM recognised 12 hard (16.7%), 29
middle (40.3%), and 44 easy (61.1%) items. The three
parts were also presented together in an ‘exploded
form’ [9]; 51 items (71.8%) were recognised in this
condition. However, a prediction of correct recognition
based on her probability of being able to recognise any
of the parts would predict a recognition score for FIM
of 55 items (76.4%). It could well be that her inability
to integrate items across space would prevent her
beneﬁting from the simultaneous presentation of all
three parts. FIM recognised 71 (98.6%) of the items
presented as whole objects. Though FIM performed
marginally better than the patient RK in object part
recognition [9], she clearly is markedly impaired at the
task.
FIM’s ability to tell the whether an object was up-
right was largely unimpaired. Twelve base objects were
each presented at a random orientation and FIM was
asked to rotate them to their correct position; this was
then repeated. She was generally accurate (within 10°)
only making one error that was more than 45° incor-
rect. Thus, the patient showed a quite different pattern
of performance to those that have been termed orienta-
tion agnosic [48,54].
3.3. Space perception
Her point localisation was assessed on the Aimark
perimeter. Within 10° of the fovea she made only minor
displacement errors. FIM’s performance on the four
spatial subtests of the VOSP was seriously impaired
(Table 1). She attempted an adaptation of the Flags
Test of Space Thinking. One pattern, which has been
rotated, has to be matched as identical to one of two
choices (Fig. 3). She appeared to be totally unable to
comprehend this task scoring only 4/10 before it was
discontinued. On the Corsi Span task [64] she was able
to attempt strings of three items reasonably accurately
but she failed with strings of four blocks. She was able
Fig. 3. Example of ‘Flags’ test of mental rotation.
to copy/tap single taps reasonably accurately (8/9
correct).
An adaptation of Benton’s line orientation task was
devised; two sloping 6.4 cm lines were arranged within
a 14.8 cm square such that 20 stimuli were parallel, 20
differed by 5° and 20 by 10°. She scored 12/20, 15/20
and 19/20, respectively on a same/different judgement.
In summary, FIM’s visual disorientation has largely
resolved; however, she still has major visual–spatial
impairment characteristic of a visual–spatial agnosia.
4. Experiment 1: discrimination of object orientation in
normal observers
4.1. Introduction
We intend using a same/different procedure with
FIM to investigate mirror image discrimination. In
order to rule out concerns about difﬁculty level, our
preliminary experiment investigates displays to deter-
mine the relative difﬁculty of mirror image to picture
plane rotation discriminations. Without such control of
the stimuli there remains the possibility that any
difﬁculty for mirror image discriminations arises from a
magniﬁcation of the small differences that normal ob-
servers may have with this particular discrimination
compared to, say, inversion discriminations. We, there-
fore, tested normal observers in a task identical to those
to be given to FIM.
Our experimental procedures will be strengthened by
the use of the non-base objects (e.g., scissors, spanner)
introduced in Davidoff and Warrington [9] to investi-
gate the effects of inversion. A recent study has further
justiﬁed making the distinction between base and non-
base objects [57]. It was found, for base objects that
increasing the rotation in the picture plane systemati-
cally impaired an object/non-object decision; this was
not the case for non-base objects [57]. We now promote
the use of non-base objects for the examination of
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mirror image discriminations. It appeared to us that,
when inverted, these non-base objects provide stimuli
that are harder to discriminate from the original than a
mirror image transformation (Fig. 1). So, using these
stimuli would add weight to any claim for a selective
impairment for mirror images not being due to the task
being more difﬁcult.
4.2. Obserers
Twenty observers (nine male, 11 female) with an age
range of 24–39 years completed the experiment. All
were members of staff recruited from hospitals in the
London area.
4.3. Stimuli
Line drawings of 24 objects with a reliable base (base
objects) and 24 objects (Appendix 1 and Fig. 4) seen
frequently at many orientations (non-base objects) were
obtained from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart [46] set.
They were scanned for use in a lap-top computer.
Stimuli were presented in pairs. A pair consisted of one
of the objects and the same object either presented in
an identical orientation or at a different orientation.
4.4. Procedure
Observers were given the following instructions: ‘In
this experiment, you will be presented with pairs of
images. Your task is to determine if the images are the
same or different. Roughly, half are the same and
roughly, half different. When the pairs are different,
one of the images will be at a different orientation or
perhaps as a mirror image. These differences will be
easy to see. You are not looking for subtle differences.
If the images are the same, then you should press the
‘same’ key and if different, the ‘different’ key. You
should respond as quickly and as accurately as
possible’.
The same pairs were presented at 0°, 45°, 90°, in-
verted, as from their orientation in Snodgrass and
Vanderwart [46]. It should be noted that for non-base
items this ranged from approximately 30–45° from the
horizontal. Each pair was presented side by side on
each side of the midline and covered roughly 5×5 cm2
on the screen. They were observed from around 30 cm.
There were 48 same pairs at every orientation with
equal numbers of base and non-base items except that
in order to present equal numbers of mirror image
stimuli the number of same stimuli presented at 0° was
96. For different stimuli, the orientation change from 0°
was equally often 45°, 90°, inverted or as a mirror
image. The 0° version for each pair was half the time on
the right of the screen and half the time on the left.
Each observer saw all 432 pairs in a different random
order. For half the observers, the ‘same’ key was on the
left and for half it was on the right. The images
remained on the screen until observers gave their
response.
4.5. Results
Latencies and accuracy scores, after removing incor-
rect responses and those more than two standard devia-
tions from the mean of each condition are shown in
Fig. 5(A) and (B).
Latencies for different responses were analysed in a 2
(Base: Base vs. Non-base) ×4 (Orientation: 45 vs. 90°
vs. inverted vs. mirror) analysis of variance with re-
peated measures over both factors. There was an effect
of orientation (F(3,57)=44.00, P0.001) and an inter-
action (F(3,57)=10.01, P0.001). An analysis of the
interaction (Fig. 5(A)) showed that, for base objects,
mirror image discriminations were harder than inverted
discriminations (t(19)=4.27, P0.001) though this
was not the case for non-base objects (t(19)=1.86,
P0.05); indeed, Fig. 5(A) shows that the latencies are
in the opposite direction. The 45 and 90° discrimina-
tions were performed faster than the other two orienta-
tion changes for both base and non-base objects (all
P0.05). Inspection of Fig. 5(B) shows that the error
data are in the same direction as the signiﬁcant effects
found in the analysis of latencies. However, errors were
rather few and even after an arcsin transformation the
analysis of variance gave no reliable effects (all P
0.2).
Fig. 4. Example of base object in 5 orientations used in Experiment 1: (a) 0°; (b) 45°; (c) 90°; (d) inverted; (e) mirror.
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Fig. 5. (A) Latencies and (B) accuracy scores for normal observers in
the discrimination of orientation differences between object pairs.
tal design used previously, FIM was asked to respond
same or different to pairs of stimuli. There were two
conditions of stimulus presentation: ‘blocked’ and ‘ran-
dom’. For the blocked condition, the stimuli were
arranged in four sets of 24 items as follows: (a) 12 base
objects paired with its mirror rotation and 12 identical
pairs, (b) 12 base items paired with its inverted rotation
and 12 identical pairs, (c) 12 non-base items paired with
its mirror rotation and 12 identical pairs (d) 12 non-base
items paired with its inverted rotation and 12 identical
pairs. For the ‘random’ condition, 16 of the base objects
and 16 of the non-base objects were paired with a mirror
image rotation, 16 of base and 16 of the non-base objects
were paired with the inverted rotation and the remaining
16 of each type of object pair were identical. These 96
stimuli were arranged in random order and, in order to
prevent fatigue, presented in three sets of 32 items. It
should be noted that in this presentation condition only
one third of the pairs were identical whereas, in the
blocked condition one half of the pairs were identical.
5.3. Results
The percent correct for the ‘blocked’ condition for
each type of paired comparison (n=24) was as follows:
mirror rotation base object, 48%; mirror rotation non-
base objects, 42%; inverted rotation base objects, 96%;
inverted rotation non-base objects, 85%. There is a
highly signiﬁcant difference between her inability to
judge mirror rotations as compared with relative intact
performance with inversion rotations; this difference was
very similar for both base and non-base stimuli.
The percent correct for each type of paired compari-
son presented in the ‘random’ condition is given in Table
2. Again FIM is very reliable in judging inversion
rotation pairs to be different but has signiﬁcant difﬁculty
in judging mirror image rotations to be different. How-
ever, this is unlikely to reﬂect a response bias towards
making ‘same’ judgements to all but the inversion
rotation pairs since she judged over half of the pairs that
were the ‘same’ to be different.
4.6. Comment
Experiment 1 established that, for normal observers,
mirror image discriminations are not always more
difﬁcult than inversion discriminations. In particular, for
non-base objects, inversion judgements are harder than
mirror image discriminations. Therefore, we can be
reassured that, when these studies are carried out on
FIM, any signiﬁcant dissociations between mirror im-
ages and picture plane orientation discrimination cannot
be merely attributed to difﬁculty level.
5. Experiment 2: orientation discrimination in FIM:
comparison of mirror image to inversion
5.1. Introduction
Our aim in this experiment was to document FIM’s
ability to detect mirror image rotations and plane rota-
tions of meaningful object stimuli.
5.2. Stimuli and procedure
The stimuli were the same 48 pictures of asymmetric
non-animate items from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart
[46] set used in Experiment 1. Following the experimen-
Table 2
Discrimination of mirror and inversion rotationsa
Mirror Inverted Identical (%)
rotation (%) rotation (%)
[3]n=16
44Base objects 9419
5031Non-base 94
objects
a FIM’s scores (% correct) for base and non-base objects in the
mirror and inversion rotation conditions tested in randomised order
(Experiment 2).
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Fig. 6. Examples of base and non-base objects presented on circular cards: (a) and (e) 0°; (b) and (f) 45°; (c) and (g) 90°; (d) and (h) mirror as
used in Experiment 3.
5.4. Comment
We have documented a very signiﬁcant inability to
differentiate an object from its mirror image. This
difﬁculty cannot be attributed to the spatial demands of
the task that require her to compare an array of two
stimuli. Similar arrays were used for the inversion
rotation conditions and this presented her with very
little difﬁculty. Indeed, her ability to distinguish be-
tween the non-base items in the inversion rotation but
not with the mirror rotation was particularly striking
since with these stimuli there are not the added cues of
normal verticality to provide extra information.
6. Experiment 3: orientation discrimination in FIM:
comparison of mirror image to 45 and 90°
6.1. Introduction
Our aim in this experiment was extend our ﬁndings
of Experiment 2 by comparing FIM’s ability to distin-
guish plane rotations other than inversions with her
ability to distinguish mirror image rotations.
6.2. Stimuli and procedure
The test stimuli consisted of 48 pictures; 24 animals,
12 mostly new objects with a base and 12 mostly new
objects without a base, selected from the Snodgrass and
Vanderwart [46] set (Appendix 1). The 45 and 90°
rotations were compared with mirror image rotations
(Fig. 6). Every stimulus item was presented in each
rotation condition and with an identical stimulus. The
stimuli were prepared on circular white cards and pre-
sented on a much larger white background card. The
background card contained discrete alignment marks to
ensure accurate orientation of stimuli.
Time constraints did not make it feasible to adopt a
fully randomised testing procedure; consequently, this
experiment was completed in two stages. In stage 1,
pairs of stimuli having either a 90° rotation, a mirror
image rotation or being identical were presented in a
randomised order making a total of 144 stimulus pairs.
In stage 2, pairs of stimuli were presented having either
a 45° rotation or being identical making a total of 96
stimulus pairs. Thus, in stage 1, a third of the stimuli
were identical pairs and in stage 2 half were identical
pairs. As before, FIM was asked to say whether the
stimulus pairs were identical or different.
6.3. Results
In Stage 1, the percent correct for each type of
stimulus pair (N=48) was as follows: 90°, 100%; mir-
ror rotation, 58%; same 92%. In Stage 2, the compari-
son between 45° and same pairs (N=48) gave 45°,
83%; same 79%.
FIM’s performance is again most impaired for the
mirror image condition. Her performance on the 90°
rotation condition was at ceiling and with the 45°
rotation fairly satisfactory and signiﬁcantly better than
with the mirror rotations. The apparent bias to giving
‘same’ responses may have been in part inﬂuenced by
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her obvious ability to detect differences with the plane
rotations.
We note that FIM has a minor difﬁculty in telling
whether base objects are upright and this may be
contributing to her errors at 45°. A more ﬁne grain
analysis of her errors in the 45° rotation condition
brought to light an otherwise unexpected ﬁnding. She
had signiﬁcantly more difﬁculty in detecting rotation
with the base stimuli, all of which had a strong horizon-
tal axis. It was also notable that she scored 23/24 on the
non-base items despite the fact that none of these
stimuli had ﬁrm horizontal or vertical axes which might
be assumed to contribute to the accuracy of such
discriminations.
6.4. Comment
We have established that FIM’s ability to detect
plane rotations of objects is relatively preserved and
contrasted with mirror image rotations is strikingly
superior. We were particularly impressed by her perfor-
mance with the non-base items. Despite having no
additional cues of verticality or horizontality even here
she detected 45° plane rotations more accurately than
the mirror image rotations. Yet to the experimenters,
for the non-base items, the differences between the
mirror rotations were often more obvious than with the
plane rotations (Fig. 6).
7. Experiment 4: non-base items comparison of mirror
image to 90° and inversion
7.1. Introduction
In Experiment 3, there was only a relatively small
number of non-base items. Our aim in this experiment
was to compare plane rotations with mirror rotations
using a larger set of non-base objects not having a
conventional or usual vertical orientation. For such
objects, a 90° or even an inversion is as familiar as what
was deemed to be the upright orientation.
7.2. Stimuli and procedure
The stimuli consisted of 24 non-base asymmetrical
items selected from the [46] set. Twelve of these stimuli
were drawn from those used in Experiment 1 and 12
from those used in Experiment 3. Each item was paired
with its mirror image rotation, a 90° rotation, an
inversion and with an identical stimulus. These 96
stimulus pairs were presented in random order in a
single session and FIM was required to make a same or
different response. Otherwise, the procedure was as in
Experiment 3.
7.3. Results
Her performance was ﬂawless for the 90° rotation
(24/24 correct), for the inverted rotation (24/24 correct)
and for the identical pairs (24/24 correct). All her errors
occurred on the mirror rotation condition (16/24
correct).
7.4. Comment
Many of the stimuli in the upright orientation were
presented with the major axis at a diagonal. The mirror
image rotation of such stimuli changed the spatial
co-ordinates of the display, whereas the inverted rota-
tion did not. Despite this additional spatial cue for
detecting the mirror image rotation it was for these
stimulus pairs and only these stimulus pairs that errors
occurred. We would suggest that this ﬁnding is very
powerful evidence of the special nature of mirror image
representations.
8. Experiment 5: FIM’s discrimination of vertical
mirror images
8.1. Introduction
Experiments 2–4 have shown that FIM has particu-
lar difﬁculty with mirror image discriminations but the
relative preservation of orientation discrimination in
the picture plane. In considering the primate’s difﬁculty
in making mirror image discrimination, Rollenhagen
and Olson [41] distinguish between lateral mirror image
discriminations (those used in Experiments 1–4) and
vertical mirror images. Monkeys had considerable
difﬁculty with lateral mirror image discriminations but
found vertical mirror image discriminations easy.
Therefore, we examined FIM’s performance on vertical
mirror image discriminations.
8.2. Stimuli
Twenty-four base and non-base stimuli (a subset of
the stimuli used in Experiment 1) were randomly pre-
sented with either identical stimuli or with its vertical
mirror image (Fig. 7) giving a total of 48 presentations.
8.3. Comment
FIM made no errors. The poor performance of FIM
with lateral mirror image discriminations does not ex-
tend to distinguishing an object from its vertical mirror
image. Thus, the pattern of performance is identical to
that found in Rollenhagen and Olson [41].
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Fig. 7. Example of discrimination of object and vertical mirror image as used in Experiment 5.
9. Experiment 6: FIM’s orientation discrimination with
symmetrical objects
9.1. Introduction
Our neuropsychological assessment of FIM showed
that her ability to detect differences in line orientation
was likely to be satisfactory for differences greater than
10°. FIM was also able to discriminate, in Experiment
3, between many objects that differed by 45° in the
picture plane. It could well be argued that her relatively
preserved orientation discrimination should promote
better performance with the mirror image non-base
displays than revealed in the previous experiments. We,
therefore, devised stimuli that might encourage match-
ing by orientation. In previous experiments, items were
chosen that were clearly asymmetrical about both prin-
cipal axes; in this experiment, we used stimuli that were
symmetrical about one axis.
9.2. Stimuli and procedure
For this experiment, we used objects symmetrical
about one axis for which a mirror image can also be
produced by a plane rotation. We, thus, made available
to FIM another procedure by which she could effect a
same/different judgement of mirror images.
We ﬁrst conﬁrmed that FIM would clearly differenti-
ate between lines at the orientations investigated in
Experiment 2. Pairs of lines were presented that were
either at the same orientation (45°), differed by 45° (i.e.
one was vertical) or one was a mirror image (i.e.
differed by 90°). Ten of each of these pairs were ran-
domly presented in a same/different task. FIM made no
errors.
FIM was then presented with 12 items symmetrical
about the vertical but not the horizontal axis from the
Snodgrass and Vanderwart set (Appendix 1). In most of
the cases, the symmetry was not perfect until the stimuli
were adapted in PHOTOSHOP. These stimuli give dis-
plays that when presented as mirror images are identi-
cal to a rotation in one direction in the picture plane.
Stimuli were presented on circular cards as in Experi-
ment 3. Three conditions were produced in which an
item presented with its principal axis at 45° was com-
pared to an identical item, its mirror image and to an
‘upside down’ condition in which the item was rotated
so that its principal axis was at the same orientation as
the mirror image (Fig. 8). The conditions were ﬁrst
blocked with ‘same’ being compared to mirror images.
The three conditions were then presented at random.
9.3. Results
For the blocked trials, FIM made 7/24 errors, when
discriminating between ‘same’ and mirror image trials.
Discriminating between ‘same’ and upside down trials;
she made only 1/24 errors (2=5.4, P0.05). In the
randomised trials, FIM made no errors on upside down
discriminations, 3/12 errors on same discriminations
and was at chance with mirror image displays (6/12
errors).
9.4. Comment
Despite the fact that her orientation ability should
have provided FIM with sufﬁcient information to per-
form the task, when lines were replaced with symmetri-
Fig. 8. Example of symmetrical object: (a) 0°; (b) mirror image; (c)
inverted as used in Experiment 6.
J. Daidoff, E.K. Warrington / Neuropsychologia 39 (2001) 1022–1036 1031
Fig. 9. Example of geometrical shape discriminations: (a) and (b)
mirror; (c) and (d) inversion as used in Experiment 7.
10.4. Comment
We have obtained a very similar pattern of results
with geometrical ﬁgures as with meaningful stimuli.
FIM is able to detect inversion rotation signiﬁcantly
more reliably than mirror image rotations. This ﬁnding
extends the generality of FIM’s impaired mirror image
discrimination to non-representational stimuli. We will
return to this issue in the Section 12.
11. Experiment 8: FIM’s orientation discrimination of
alphanumeric stimuli
11.1. Introduction
We have established that FIM’s inability to detect
mirror images as compared with plane rotations occurs
for both meaningful object stimuli and for non-mean-
ingful shapes. It therefore becomes of interest to con-
sider whether this would also apply to well-known
verbal symbols for which handedness is important.
Many letters and numbers are asymmetric about the
vertical axis. The conventional right/left orientation
though difﬁcult to acquire becomes an overlearned
skill. Our aim in this experiment was to assess FIM’s
ability to detect mirror image rotations compared with
inversion rotations of letter stimuli.
In a pilot study, FIM was presented with 20 pairs of
asymmetrical letters (C, D, E, F, G, K, L, P, R, S) in
which ten were paired with its mirror image and ten
were identical. FIM was asked to respond same or
different and her performance was ﬂawless (20/20).
11.2. Stimuli and procedure
The test stimuli consisted of the letters F, G, J, L, P,
R, and the numbers 4, 5. Each stimulus was paired with
a mirror image rotation, an inversion rotation and with
the identical stimulus. In addition, each inverted stimu-
lus was paired with its mirror image rotation and an
identical stimulus. There were thus a total of 32 stimu-
lus pairs which were presented in a randomised order
and FIM was again asked to respond same or different.
cal objects, she once again began to fail with mirror
image discriminations. The mirror image presentations
appear to override her preserved orientation skills.
10. Experiment 7: FIM’s orientation discrimination
with geometric ﬁgures
10.1. Introduction
In Experiment 6, we recorded further evidence of
FIM’s selective difﬁculty in detecting mirror image
rotations. Our aim in this experiment was to establish
whether there would be the same pattern of perfor-
mance with meaningless geometrical ﬁgures.
10.2. Stimuli and procedure
The test stimuli consisted of 15 complex meaningless
geometrical ﬁgures (Fig. 9). Each ﬁgure was paired with
its mirror image rotation and with inverted rotation
image. Each of these conditions was tested in ‘blocks’
with an equal number of identical pairs. There were
thus a total of 60 trials and these two ‘blocks’ were
represented on a second occasion.
10.3. Results
The percent correct for each condition for each trial
is given in Table 3. On trial 1, there was a strong trend
for a higher error rate for the mirror rotations than the
inverted rotation (2=3.35, P0.1) and on trial 2, the
difference between the two conditions was signiﬁcant
(2=7.7, P0.01). The difference between the total
scores for the two conditions was also signiﬁcant (2=
10.2, P0.01).
Table 3
Discrimination of mirror rotations and inverted rotations for geomet-
rical shapesa
Mirror rotation (%) Inverted rotation(%)
67 86Trial 1 (n=30)
9770Trial 2 (n=30)
68Total (n=60) 92
a FIM’s scores (% correct) for mirror and inverted rotations (Ex-
periment 7).
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11.3. Results
FIM obtained 29/32 (91%) correct responses. Of the
three errors, she judged two inverted Ps to be different
and an inverted mirror image pair of a G and an L (i.e.,
paired with the inverted letter) to be the same.
11.4. Comment
With these letter stimuli, FIM’s ability to detect
mirror image rotations improved dramatically and in-
deed the only errors occurred with the inverted stimuli.
FIM demonstrated an entirely satisfactory ability to
detect mirror rotations with verbal symbols that have a
conventional handedness structure. FIM has no
difﬁculty with letter recognition and is therefore pre-
sumably able to reject the mirror images as incorrect
letters. This ﬁnding reinforces the selective difﬁculty she
has in detecting mirror image rotations of objects that
do not have a ﬁxed handedness.
12. General discussion
We present here data from a patient who showed a
marked problem with mirror image discriminations
compared to discriminations between inversions or
other plane rotations. Our aims for this study were ﬁrst
to rule out artifacts that might limit the claim for
selective impairment and second to identify the func-
tional locus for the disorder. Considering our ﬁrst aim,
Experiment 1 examined the effects of rotation on the
base and non-base objects introduced in Davidoff and
Warrington [9]. It was shown that normal observers
found inversion discriminations harder than mirror im-
age discriminations for non-base objects but not for
base objects. However, FIM found mirror image dis-
criminations harder than inversion discriminations for
both base and non-base objects (Experiments 2 and 4).
These experiments thereby rule out the possibility that
FIM’s failure with mirror image discriminations was a
matter of difﬁculty level. The selectivity of FIM’s im-
pairment was examined in Experiments 3 and 4. In
those experiments, it was showed that FIM had no
difﬁculty in making object orientation discriminations
over 45° in the picture plane. Thus, we have shown in
FIM a particularly selective impairment for mirror
image discriminations.
Our second aim concerned the signiﬁcance of im-
paired mirror image discrimination to models of object
recognition. FIM’s poor performance raises the ques-
tion of how mirror image discrimination is achieved in
our same/different paradigm with respect to the alter-
native routes for object recognition. Corballis and
Beale [8] argued that our paradigm does not truly test
mirror image discrimination because correct discrimina-
tion can be achieved without an assignment of handed-
ness to each stimulus. However, we would argue that
our paradigm makes FIM’s failure all the more remark-
able. It is even more striking that a failure to make
mirror image discriminations is revealed, when success
could have been achieved by several procedures. It is
worthwhile, therefore, to consider those alternative pro-
cedures and their contribution to object recognition.
The ﬁrst procedure, we shall consider for mirror
image discrimination is that involving the mental rota-
tion of one object to attempt a ﬁt to the other. There is
an appealingly parsimonious proposal that mental rota-
tion explains all processing for object identiﬁcation that
require plane and depth transformations including mir-
ror image discriminations [18,20,21,37,51,52]. However,
there are good reasons to doubt the role of mental
rotation in dealing with most picture plane or depth
rotations. With respect to identiﬁcation after picture
plane rotation, recent research has questioned whether
mental rotation is fundamentally important [7,16,31].
Lawson and Jolicoeur [31], for example, showed that
the relationship between plane rotation and presenta-
tion duration required for object identiﬁcation was not,
in fact, linear; whereas, it was linear for making mirror
image judgements in a mental rotation task. Lawson
[27] argued, therefore, that mental rotation was not
used in recognising objects in plane rotation.
The recognition of plane rotated objects, in fact,
emphasises the role of inversion resistant features. Re-
peated naming of familiar objects reduces plane rota-
tion effects [20,21,23,31,35] but practice does not reduce
plane rotation effects in deciding which direction an
object would face if it were upright [21]. Practice,
according to Jolicoeur [22], encourages a feature based
discrimination useful for object identiﬁcation but is
irrelevant for a mirror image discrimination task. With
practice, subjects learn to recognise objects using fea-
tures that are invariant to plane rotation. Turnbull and
McCarthy [56] also argued, from neuropsychological
evidence, that mental rotation skills were not responsi-
ble for object identiﬁcation of misoriented objects.
Their patient showed normal mental rotation skills in
the Shepard and Metzler [45] task yet, nevertheless,
misidentiﬁed drawings of objects if they were rotated in
the picture plane.
Similar arguments with respect to mental rotation, to
those of Turnbull and McCarthy [56] and Lawson and
Jolicoeur [32], were used earlier for the recognition of
objects rotated in the depth plane. Warrington and
James [59] showed that object recognition did not nec-
essarily become more difﬁcult the greater the depth
rotation; it more depended upon whether the rotation
hindered the identiﬁcation of object parts. Indeed, men-
tal rotation would be impossible to employ for recogni-
tion of an unidentiﬁed object. Without knowing the
identity of an object, one would simply not know in
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which direction to rotate the object in depth. Of course,
there are circumstances where mental rotation could be
useful in making discriminations based on depth rota-
tion. One of those circumstances is our same/different
mirror image discrimination paradigm. It is only when
knowing the identity of an object or, as in our case,
being given the sample to match, that mental rotation
could be a useful mechanism for mirror image discrim-
ination. However, FIM’s disastrous performance on
mental rotation tasks would preclude this ﬁrst proce-
dure to achieve mirror image discrimination.
The second procedure for achieving mirror image
discriminations concerns a spatial comparison of the
different view-speciﬁc representations formed from the
mirror images. Since Marr [32], most models make a
distinction between object-centred (view-independent)
and view-centred (view-speciﬁc) representations. Several
later models have even made anatomical distinctions
between routes that would deal with these two types of
representation. [25,36,60]. On most of these models, the
routes concerned with view-speciﬁc representations
have been linked with both parietal structures and
spatial processing in what is known as the ‘‘dorsal
route’’ [25,36,54]. However, the role, if any, of spatial
analysis in view-speciﬁc representations for object
recognition is still uncertain on these models. In Milner
and Goodale [36], for example, the bilaterally repre-
sented viewer-centred representations are available for
motor action even in cases of gross failures of object
recognition. The neuropsychological account of War-
rington [60] originally proposed a serial route involving
right parietal structures for viewer-centred object recog-
nition but was revised in a later report to make the
right parietal involvement an optional resource that
codes knowledge of object parts [43]. The left hemi-
sphere object recognition system was driven by canoni-
cal view representations [9,43].
Irrespective of issues concerned with localisation,
there are at least two ways that spatial frames could be
analysed to achieve a discrimination between mirror
images. The ﬁrst is a metric system that codes in terms
of co-ordinates in a spatial frame; the second is a
categorical system that codes space according to equiv-
alence classes (e.g., left/right). Kosslyn et al. [25] pro-
posed that the two systems could be mapped on to
hemispheric function rather in the way proposed by
Semmes et al. [44]. The metric system of spatial analysis
would be subserved by right hemisphere structures [62]
and the categorical system by left hemisphere structures
(though see Ref. [5] for an alternative view of the locus
of the two systems).
Using a categorical coding system for mirror image
discrimination within our paradigm would be effortful
and particularly difﬁcult for FIM. For example, to code
mirror images of a dog in a categorical code, she would
have to code head to the right and tail to the left in one
display and head to the left and tail to the right in the
other. Furthermore, her metric coding would make
allocating the position of the head in the frame difﬁcult
and her poor object part recognition [9] would not help
in isolating the parts.
Turning to consider procedures that would allow
metric comparisons, we note FIM’s abysmal perfor-
mance on the spatial tasks of the VOSP (Table 1). It
would, for example, be difﬁcult for her to differentiate
mirror images by using procedures for comparison of
positions between two spatial frames. In considering an
earlier patient [9], we favoured impairments to such
spatially based systems for explaining all object orienta-
tion-matching deﬁcits. However, FIM has retained a
considerable ability to compare object orientation and
we would, therefore, revise our position for the present
case where the matching impairment is very much
restricted to comparisons between mirror images. We
turn instead to the third procedure available to FIM.
The third procedure for achieving mirror image dis-
criminations concerns object identiﬁcation. In particu-
lar, we want to consider the role of view-independent
(canonical view) representations. A recent account ex-
plicitly dealing with normal object recognition
(Stankiewicz et al. [49]) again proposes two routes. One
route for object identiﬁcation uses structural descrip-
tions and the other route for object identiﬁcation uses a
metric analysis of the representation. Its interest for our
present study is that the structural description route is
unable to make mirror image discriminations while the
metric analysis route is capable of making the distinc-
tion. We would like to claim ([14]) that the intact left
hemisphere produces a bias towards the use of canoni-
cal view representations. If object processing takes this
direction, then failure to make mirror image discrimina-
tions could be a direct consequence. We ﬁrst amplify on
why the present data point to the use of canonical view
representations.
The neuropsychological dissociation between accu-
rate object identiﬁcation and impaired object orienta-
tion in the picture plane poses problems for any stage
dependent theory of object recognition [54]. For exam-
ple, it does not ﬁt with Marr [32] who proposed that
recognition was dependent on the prior production of
view-dependent representations. However, more dam-
aging than impairments with picture plane rotations,
allowing the caveats of Karnath et al. [24], are the
present data ([55]) on impaired mirror image discrimi-
nation. Despite the arguments of Haywood [17], it is
difﬁcult to reconcile intact canonical view object recog-
nition with models that promote view-speciﬁc informa-
tion and, therefore, ought to allow mirror image
discrimination. Thus, we would argue that FIM, who
has great difﬁculty recognising objects from unconven-
tional views, is using canonical (view-independent) rep-
resentations for object identiﬁcation. The present data
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even rule out the possibility that FIM is using view-spe-
ciﬁc representations by recourse to the recognition of
object parts that are known to be less sensitive to the
effects of inversion and mirror image rotation. FIM,
and also RK in Davidoff and Warrington [9], showed
that this mechanism is likely to be unavailable as she
was impaired at the recognition of object parts.
The one type of object for which view-independent
representations would allow mirror image discrimina-
tion is that where neural systems have been coded for
handedness as they are for letters and numbers. Thus,
the exception to FIM’s inability to discriminate be-
tween mirror images was for letters and numbers. A
similar exception was found in RJ [55]. Also, RK [9]
could differentiate mirror image shoes by labelling them
‘left shoe’ or ‘right shoe’. It is, therefore, reasonable to
argue that the only occasions where unilateral left-sided
lesions produce impairments for mirror images are
when they concern objects coded for handed-
ness.[15,19,39,44]. Further conﬁrmation of the different
hemispheric processing involved in left/right discrimina-
tion compared to other mirror image tasks comes from
recent studies that required identiﬁcation of either the
left or right hand on a pictured body [65,66]. They
found that, for hand identiﬁcation, the latency to re-
spond is invariant with respect to the orientation of the
body [65]. Moreover, cortical activity activated during
the task involves left hemisphere sites [66] whereas
mental activity that required imagined rotation was
found not only to be linearly sensitive to orientation
but also to involve right hemisphere activity [38,66].
Our proposal for the use of canonical representations
by FIM prompts consideration of the conditions under
which use is also made of the spatially based proce-
dures (see above) that allow an analysis within a spatial
frame. The spatial analysis required for differentiating
mirror images in our paradigm ought not to be particu-
larly difﬁcult. For example, an earlier patient (JBA)
despite rather poor shape discrimination was able to
distinguish between mirror images [58]. However, JBA
was only able to differentiate mirror images if she could
not recognise the object or it was a geometric shape.
We argued that JBA, having recognised objects from
canonical view representations was unable to disengage
from them to attempt a spatial analysis. Hence, the
inability to discriminate mirror images was present only
for objects that she could recognise. We would argue
that FIM also showed difﬁculty disengaging from
canonical view representations. In FIM’s case, we
would argue that it explains why her object orientation
abilities do not allow mirror image discrimination and
also why it prevented her making mirror image discrim-
inations of geometrical shapes. We will consider each
assertion in turn.
In Experiment 6, we showed that FIM was poor at
discriminating between mirror images of laterally sym-
metrical objects; this is a task at which she might have
been presumed to succeed given her reasonably intact
line orientation discrimination. The results of Experi-
ment 6 make clear the particular place mirror image
discriminations play in object identiﬁcation. Once iden-
tiﬁcation is attempted from canonical view representa-
tions, no difference can be detected between mirror
images. Hence, for mirror image stimuli, the orientation
discrimination task is apparently ‘solved’. For the pa-
tient, there is no need to disengage from these represen-
tations to attempt orientation discrimination by other
procedures even when they are within the capabilities of
FIM. However, other differences in object orientation
create a mismatch in the object identiﬁcation proce-
dures and a disengagement takes place to allow spa-
tially based procedures to operate. It would appear (see
also supporting data in Ref. [6]) that relatively small
discrepancies (around 45°) may be all that is required
for the canonical route identiﬁcation system to note the
mismatch. Our data would imply that a mismatch is
more easily noted for a change in plane orientation
than for a mirror image.
We would propose a similar disengagement account
for the failure of FIM to discriminate between mirror
images of geometric shapes. FIM’s shape discrimina-
tion (unlike that of JBA) was good and likewise her
canonical object recognition. We might speculate that,
in those conditions, the use of the more object-based
route [49] takes place even for geometric shapes. In this
context, it might be helpful to consider the concept of a
geon [3]. Geons are held to be a speciﬁc set of geomet-
ric shapes (volumes) that constitute the basis of all
object recognition. It would be unlikely that JBA would
be able to analyse geometric shapes into their geon
sections to proceed down an object-based route. Hence,
not going down that path, her preserved spatial skills
were able to carry out the rather simple task of discrim-
inating mirror images for geometric shapes. Further
research with FIM, investigating the geon-like proper-
ties of meaningless displays, may provide an answer.
However, our suggestion at least proposes an answer to
the different patterns of performance with geometric
shapes for JBA and FIM.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated a rather speciﬁc
difﬁculty with mirror image discriminations in a patient
whose abilities to make other orientation judgements
are relatively preserved. Her failure at mirror image
discrimination emphasises the peculiar place lateral
mirror images occupy within the visual system. Lateral
mirror images would seem to be a special class of
stimuli [41] for which we need a great deal of training
to distinguish. The length of the training would come as
no surprise if Deregowski, et al. [11] are correct in their
belief that the brain automatically produces a lateral
mirror image of every presented stimulus. Several alter-
natives offer themselves in our paradigm for resolving
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mirror images. Of these, mental rotation and alternative
forms of spatial analysis would be largely unavailable
for FIM. However, her ability to differentiate line
orientation and object orientation in the picture plane
might have been presumed sufﬁcient for her to differen-
tiate between mirror images. It leads us to speculate
that FIM does not use her limited spatial skills because
her intact left hemisphere object identiﬁcation proce-
dures produce a bias towards the use of canonical
representations. These are completely inadequate for
mirror image discriminations. Furthermore, the inabil-
ity to make the discrimination prevents her from disen-
gaging from these representations to use her residual
spatial skills.
Appendix 1
Experiment 1: The stimuli used were: Base – bed,
bicycle, boot, bus, car, chair, couch, cup, gun, iron,
ironing board, jug, kettle, lorry, motor-bicycle, pram,
rocking chair, saucepan, shoe, suitcase, telephone, tele-
vision, toaster, watering-can.
Non-base – axe, broom, brush, chisel, comb, fork,
glove, hammer, key, knife, lock, mitten, paintbrush,
peg, pliers, plug, saw, scissors, screw, screwdriver, span-
ner, spectacles, toothbrush, violin.
Experiment 3: Animals – bear, bird, camel, cat,
chicken, cow, deer, dog, donkey, duck, elephant, ﬁsh,
fox, giraffe, goat, gorilla, grasshopper, horse, kangaroo,
lion, mouse, ostrich, pig, tiger.
Base – basket, cannon, chest of drawers, church,
coat, frying pan, harp, hat, jug, record player, roller
skate, sailing boat.
Non-base – coat hanger, ﬂag, guitar, kite, pen, pipe,
pliers, sock, spoon, tennis racquet, umbrella, whistle.
Experiment 6: bat, bell, bottle, bowl, chisel, envelope,
glass, guitar, lamp, light-bulb, lobster, nut.
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